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‘‘It is that markets and marketplaces come in many forms, some of which don’t conform to conventional
notions of markets, and some in which money may play little or no role’’ (Roth, 2015, p. 31).
Justice conflicts are prevalent across many instances of human interaction. Social
justice research has a long history of addressing these issues and investigating them
from a broad scope of disciplines such as psychology, sociology, political science,
and economics. This book review essay introduces a relatively novel branch of
economics—market design—to the audience of social justice researchers. It
sketches its main thoughts and avenues of research along with applications in
domains relevant for social justice research. In 2012, Alvin E. Roth shared the Bank
of Sweden Prize in Memory of Alfred Nobel in Economic Science (commonly
referred to as the Nobel Prize in Economics) with Lloyd E. Shapley for the theory of
stable allocations and the practice of market design. In ‘‘Who gets what and Why?
The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design’’ (2015, Eamon Dolan/
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt), Roth introduces the field to novices. The book provides
a viable opportunity for social justice researchers to quickly familiarize themselves
with some of the most relevant results of market design research before consulting
the more technical literature that largely relies on game theory.
Social justice research has an inherent interest in how people, groups, or societies
deal with competition over scarce resources. Many theories of social conflict
suggest that at instances when people try to allocate scarce resources, individual (or
group-based) egoistic inclinations lead to competitive action that ultimately result in
social harm (Lind, 1995). A key challenge for social justice research is to overcome
these harms. Market design and the related field of behavioral economic engineering
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(e.g., Bolton & Ockenfels, 2012) designs real-world institutions and mechanisms
that align individual incentives with the underlying goals set by societies,
companies or other social groups. Market design is a hybrid between theory and
application as it has a strong focus on (economic and related) theory but a strong
interest in applying insights in the real world, leading to the connotation of the
economist as an ‘‘engineer’’ (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2012; Roth, 2002).
The aim of the essay is to raise the interest of social justice researchers in the
economic discipline of market design and to promote market design thinking and
related projects to the social justice community. The central question is whether we
can use market design to ‘‘engineer’’ fair outcomes even when we make the
assumption that people behave strongly self-interested. In these cases, can we
prevent that competitive action leads to social harm, but instead to social benefits
that may come in the form of sufficient organ availability, fair participation in
education of many students, et cetera? Although the assumption of (strong) self-
interest can be regarded as cynical and at odds with many of the findings of
psychological research on justice (e.g., van den Bos, Cropanzano, Kirk, Jasso, &
Okimoto, 2015, for a discussion of Vermunt, 2014), most of the areas that market
design touches are ‘‘high-stakes’’ situations (e.g., altruistic organ donations,
allocation of students to schools, job market entries for academics) where it is
hard for fairness to emerge. This is owed to the fact that market design often
addresses the allocation of non-divisible ‘‘goods’’, thus, disenabling ‘‘easy’’
solutions to justice conflicts (i.e., where, for instance, justice principles such as
the equity, equality, or need offer a solution to the conflict). Selfless behavior in
such ‘‘high-stakes’’ situation of non-divisible goods may mean not receiving a life-
saving organ, not getting into a preferred school, or not having a job after getting a
Ph.D. It is clear that these situations make it particularly hard for fairness
motivations to emerge as giving up your entitlement entirely is necessary to behave
selflessly. In these types of situations, it is clear that social conflict can be best
mitigated if efficiency is enhanced (i.e., more people can get what they want). This
is an important goal of market design.
Markets, Matching Markets, and Market Failures
Roth (2015, Part I) starts his book highlighting the prevalence of markets in our
lives. Markets are virtually everywhere and—contrary to common conception—do
not always need money as an allocation mechanism. Markets are defined rather
broadly: Whenever scarce resources are exchanged or matched, the exchange or
match takes place in a market. Of particular interest to market designers are so-
called matching markets, where the ‘‘things’’ that we choose also need to choose us.
Among matching markets are the labor market, certain real-estate markets where the
seller can freely choose a buyer, or admission to colleges and schools.
For instance, a company cannot just hire the person who costs least to perform a
well-defined task, this person also has to choose the company as their employer.
From the perspective of a university, the dean will not hire the individual who is
willing to give a lecture on ‘‘social justice research’’ for the lowest price. Likewise,
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the smartest social justice researcher is (hopefully) not going to teach at the
university who simply offers the most dollars for giving the lecture. Usually, when
recruiting a new freshman class of 1000 people, an admissions officer will not just
enroll the 1000 people who are willing to pay the most for their degree. Importantly,
although these markets involve money (e.g., salaries, tuition, etc.), money is not the
critical aspect in the transaction. Speaking in terms of economics, the price is not
raised until demand equals supply. Rather, there is a selection process and finding a
suitable match goes beyond price as an allocation tool.
That said, Roth (2015) describes matching markets as fundamentally different
from commodity markets. In a commodity market, anyone can buy anything she/he
wants; so long she/he can afford it. When people sell their stock market funds to buy
a house, they generally do not care who buys these funds, just as grocery sellers are
typically only interested that people pay for their groceries, but not who these
paying people actually are. In commodity markets, the price does all the work.1
Importantly, markets can move from matching market to a commodity market, i.e.,
if a good is commoditized. Roth provides several examples of these in the book to
illustrate that most markets are dynamic and might change in their inherent
characteristics over time. For example, wheat was not always traded as a
commodity, but started being commoditized after the Chicago Board of Trade
introduced a classification grade and typology to make it comparable across
producers and years, even enabling the sale of wheat that will only be produced in
later years (e.g., selling wheat futures).
Many of the most prominent examples of market re-designs that are relevant to
social justice research take place in matching markets, among them the market for
kidney exchange (e.g., Rees et al., 2009), the school choice algorithms in Boston
(Abdulkadirog˘lu, Pathak, Roth, & So¨nmez, 2005), New York (Abdulkadirog˘lu,
Pathak, & Roth, 2005, 2009), and other cities (Chen & Kesten, 2012), as well as the
job market placing programs for new doctors (Roth, 1991), lawyers/judicial clerks
(Avery, Jolls, Posner, & Roth, 2001), and Ph. D. economists (e.g., in Roth, 2008a).
Subsequently, Roth (2015) describes common reasons why markets fail due to
the behavior of competitive market participants. Among these reasons are individual
attempts to ‘‘jump the gun’’ in order to achieve an advantage over others in a
‘‘thick’’ marketplace consisting of many buyers and sellers, excessive speed in
markets, as well as congestion of a market place (too many parties in a given
timeframe). For instance, hiring a person earlier can lead to the hiring of better
talents, but comes at the cost of premature hiring when the skillset of a prospective
employee is not yet clear. In a competitive scenario, all firms might hire too early
(e.g., hiring assistant professors up to a year before their graduation), because they
fear that they will not be able to meet their hiring needs.
A second common failure is ‘‘speed.’’ Especially in financial markets, arms races
that lead to quick trading can lead to inefficiencies as resources are invested merely
in the speed of trade. For instance, if trading at the level of milliseconds is allowed
1 Importantly, in some labor markets, people are in fact seen as a commodity, especially with respect to
low-skilled labor. Employers might not care who will do a low-skill task and only care about the price of
it. While these labor markets have their own challenges in term of social justice, many high-skilled labor
markets function as matching markets that face different, but equally important justice-issues.
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by a stock exchange, it can be reasonable for traders to invest in high-speed
information technology that would be useless if trading were only allowed at the
level of seconds. Finally, another failure of market speed consists of so-called
exploding offers, which are job offers that have to be accepted before a certain
deadline in order to still be valid. All of these market failures result from economic
agents making competitively reasonable and optimal choices in the bounds of the
law. For instance, hiring professors before they even graduate may be inefficient and
unfair, but competitive parties may feel forced to play along.
Examples of Market (Re-)designs
Roth (2015) describes some of the most prominent examples of redesigned markets.
Here, the most commonly known examples are given to show the reader two
successful outcomes that market design has achieved and which are directly relevant
to social justice research.2
Kidney Exchange
One example in which scarcity and justice conflicts are apparent is organ donation.
Especially when deceased-donor organs are not sufficiently available, it takes more
than a willing living donor to save a life or to make it more enjoyable (e.g., by
sparing a kidney disease patient dialysis). There is a long list of criteria that have to
match in order for an individual to qualify as a donor. Quite often, a patient cannot
receive an organ due to the fact that none of their prospective donors are compatible.
From psychological research on taboo tradeoffs3 (Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, &
Lerner, 2000), we know that people find it particularly wrong to use money in these
kinds of situations. The limited organs should clearly not be sold to the highest
bidders. Although many illegal routes to purchased organs exist, societies across the
globe almost unanimously reject the idea that human organs should be for sale. If
societies try to reduce scarcity in such a market, they have to do so without the use
of payments to donors, which may boost organ supply.
Although initially not intended for an application in the ‘‘kidney market,’’
Shapley and Scarf (1974) formulated a mathematical thought experiment that
exactly matches this problem of scarce kidneys: How can people trade indivisible
goods if everyone needs just one, has one to trade, and can’t use money? Roth and
2 In general, I refer to ,,relevant for social justice research’’ when a market directly touches some sphere
of individual justice concerns. Although most market designs can be named relevant from a justice
perspective, not all of them directly involve people’s concern for justice. For instance, market design is
quite influential in spectrum auctions, in which governments allow mobile phone companies to bid for
frequency. Although the revenue of such goes into a country’s tax base and is then used for social
security, education, etc., it is not directly justice-related. The agents that bid in such an auction (i.e., firms,
with the help of game-theorists) try to behave in a highly self-interest and mathematically optimal
manner. Also, market designs that affect trading in high-speed financial markets are only indirectly
justice-relevant. Examples cited in the essay have a direct relation to people’s concerns for justice.
3 Roth refers to this general reluctance to trade everything for money as ‘‘repugnance’’ (e.g., Roth,
2008b).
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his colleagues identified that these people from the thought experiment could be
viewed as incompatible patient–donor pairs. Shapley and Scarf (1974) found a
mathematical solution to the riddle showing that for any given preference there is
always a set of cyclical trades (e.g., ‘‘top-trading cycles’’) with the property that no
group of people would rather go off and find a better outcome. Therefore, a given
set of cyclical trades can achieve an efficient outcome—one that the group as a
whole cannot outperform—without the use of money. Thus, the trading cycle
achieves economic efficiency without giving up sacred values by using money as a
means of exchange, an act that we might consider ‘‘taboo’’ (Tetlock et al., 2000).
Roth and his colleagues used the approach of cyclical trades to re-design the way
living donors can exchange organs in the USA (Ashlagi & Roth, 2014; Roth,
So¨nmez, & U¨nver, 2004; 2005, 2007; Saidman, Roth, So¨nmez, U¨nver, &
Delmonico, 2006; Rees et al., 2009).
Importantly, kidney exchanges used to be performed only pairwise and simulta-
neously. The simultaneitywas seen as critical to avoid that one party refuses a donation
after his or her patient has received a life-saving organ. Thismalign incentive structure
made non-simultaneous, longer organ donation chains impossible. The market
redesign therefore focused also on reducing the risk of donating a kidney and
subsequently losing the bargaining chip (i.e., a donor) if the other donor reneges on his
or her gift. A reduction of that risk (e.g., by securing that victims of a reluctant donor
receive an organ from another donor) enabled to move from pairwise donations to
donation chains, therefore increasing the total number of transplants (see Rees et al.,
2009, for a detailed discussion of a never-ending altruistic donor chain). To sumup, the
kidney exchange programs in the USA could be re-designed with the help of
theoretical insights from game theory that have been applied to a particular matching
market that carefully took real-world motivations (e.g., fear of reneging) into account
when designing the rules that allowed an increase in transplants.
School Choice
Other prominent examples of market (re-)designs are the Boston and New York
school matches (Abdulkadirog˘lu, et al., 2005, 2009). Finding a suitable school is a
very important decision for the progression of children’s and teenagers’ lives. In
fact, getting into the ‘‘right’’ school is a key concern for many students and their
parents as the quality of school education is seen as a significant driver of success in
life. It is easily imaginable how not getting into a school that one likes (and seeing
others getting into their preferred school) might cause severe justice conflicts in a
community. In fact, I am confident that a content analysis of parents’ and students’
complaints about allocation to schools would put ‘‘unfairness’’ to the top of the list
of arguments why the system is flawed.
Like organ donations, there is a large consensus that public schools cannot be
filled based on the individual willingness or ability to pay for access. Allocation of
students to schools is also a matching market without the use of money. The student
has to choose the school just like the school has to offer a spot to the student, and
there are numerous restrictions, similar to kidney exchange (e.g., distance to the
school, siblings in the same school, diversity goals of the municipality, etc.)
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Many municipalities across the globe use(d)—from the perspective of market
design—rules that put many students into schools that they did not want to go to.
One common mistake was—and probably still is in many municipalities—that it is
often wise for students to misreport their stated preference about which school to
want to attend. For instance, if students can list only three preferences, the
assignment rules may cause students to ‘‘game’’ the system.4 Roth (2015) describes
in detail how the nuances of the rules never made it smart for students to report their
preference honestly in Boston and New York. In addition, Roth shows how
laboratory experiments could prove that families have most likely been misreporting
their preferences due to the need of ‘‘gaming’’ the system (Chen & So¨nmez, 2006).
It is not surprising that many students and their parents found the system unjust,
both from a procedural and distributive justice perspective. A change in the rules
(e.g., the introduction of deferred-acceptance algorithms, see Abdulkadirog˘lu, et al.,
2005) made it safe for students to report their true preferences and, thus, also
increased the perception of procedural justice. Like in organ donation, the justice
conflict could be mitigated following a change in the rules that mitigates perceived
scarcity as more students could be assigned to a (truly) preferred school.
Critique and Relevance: Market Design as a Resource for Social Justice
Research?
Upon reading the book, I had the impression that social justice research and market
design provide mutual opportunities for each other. Market design has been ultra-
successful as a field due to its high practical relevance for the solution of real-world
justice conflicts, among them fundamental problems involving distributive justice of
essential ‘‘goods’’ such as education, medical care, or job market participation,
despite (or because) its theoretical rigor. Therefore, market design can be a useful
new tool to a largely descriptive discipline that focuses on the psychology of justice.
With the help of market design, (especially) psychological justice research cannot
only identify justice conflicts, but also help to solve them by changing the
institutional details that cause the conflict. The book is rather moot about the ability
of market design to mitigate justice conflicts. However, Roth powerfully shows how
questions of efficiency and—implicitly—procedural as well as distributive justice
could be reconciled, whereas it is often seen as a trade-off (e.g., Okun, 2015). If
many future social conflicts involve the distribution of scarce resources (e.g., water,
safe living environments, energy), market design can be viewed as a key tool to
mitigate such. Some recent work has already started to combine insights that are
traditionally rooted in social justice research. For instance, re-designing the
reputation system of Ebay (Bolton, Greiner, & Ockenfels, 2013) followed some key
4 Imagine such a rule in academia: Researchers across the fields would be allowed to submit their paper
to a maximum of three journals. If it is repeatedly rejected, it will randomly be published in a journal of a
bureaucrat’s choosing. It is clear that submitting it to the three top journals is a quite risky endeavor.
Quite likely, researchers would strategize about the best journal that their article will barely make it into
and submission behavior would not at all signal preference for a particular journal. Worse, it may even be
optimal to bribe the bureaucrat who will end up allocating articles to the journals (not) randomly.
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ideas about reciprocity and revenge (e.g., Gollwitzer & Denzler, 2009) and the re-
design of a global company’s bonus program (Ockenfels, Sliwka, & Werner, 2014)
used theoretical insights that are central to our field, among them social comparison
theory (e.g., Festinger, 1954), prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), and
relative deprivation theory (Stouffer et al., 1949).
Quite regularly, individuals are frustrated with organizational or societal settings
that determine an outcome. I want to argue that many of our everyday frustrations
are rooted in perceptions of injustice or feelings of unfair treatment. Roth describes
this particularly well with respect to school choice. Before Boston and New York
have received the new designs, it was clear to many parents that the system is flawed
and needed to be ‘‘gamed.’’ Naturally, rules that need to be ‘‘gamed’’ highlight
shortcomings regarding procedural justice and give people the feedback that they
may not be respected members in their community (e.g., Huo, Smith, Tyler, & Lind,
1996; Lind & Tyler, 1988, 1992). The redesign of school assignment did not only
increase efficiency, but perhaps more importantly, the procedural justice in the
system, giving children and their parents the feeling of being respected.
To sum up, I think that Roth’s (2015) book ‘‘Who gets what and Why?’’ provides
a viable opportunity for social justice scholars to familiarize themselves with the
main ideas and selected achievements of market design. Wrapped up in personal
anecdotes from an exciting research life, Roth manages to introduce a topic to a
broader audience that has been traditionally dominated by complex game-
theoretical jargon. The mere fact that market design has been influential in many
fields, among them law, medicine, education, but also government auctions, makes
the field interesting to our community. In his final conclusions, Roth states that
markets are not a natural phenomenon, but human artifacts that can be maintained,
improved, and sometimes even newly created. With justice being a core concern of
humans, market design as a method to increase procedural and distributional justice
can be a valuable add-on to the justice researcher’s toolbox, especially when we
adopt Roth’s relatively broad conception of a market.
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